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SUMMARY
In Central Africa, trophy hunting constitutes an incentive-based approach for sustainable wildlife management. We collected data from the 
wildlife administration, safari hunting enterprises and local wildlife management committees, to provide an order of magnitude of the financial 
performance of this sector in Cameroon. In 2012, trophy hunting was likely to generate an annual turnover of € 7.5 million and its added value 
could amount to only 0.0001% of GDP although these hunting zones cover 12% of the national territory. The profit margin for professional 
guides had become negative, with a net annual profit around € –0.7 million. The severe crisis in the trophy hunting sector is mainly due to an 
increase in the management costs of the hunting zones and the diminishing price of hunting safaris. The State plays a crucial role in enhancing 
the financial attractiveness of trophy hunting by the restoration of security in the Northern region and by technical measures to (1) clarify 
the allocation process for hunting areas, (2) simplify regulations and (3) establish an incentives system for law enforcement at national and 
local levels.
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La chasse sportive reste-t-elle un modèle rentable pour conserver la biodiversité au Cameroun?
G. LESCUYER, J. NGoUhoUo PoUfoUN, L. DEfo, D. BASTIN et P. SChoLTE
En Afrique centrale, la chasse sportive constitue une approche incitative pour la gestion durable de la faune sauvage. Nous avons collecté des 
données auprès de l’administration en charge de la faune, des entreprises de safari de chasse et des comités locaux de gestion de la faune pour 
produire un ordre de grandeur des performances financières de ce secteur au Cameroun. En 2012, la chasse sportive a probablement généré un 
chiffre d’affaires annuel autour de 7.5 millions d’Euros et sa valeur ajoutée a pu contribuer à seulement 0.0001% du PIB, alors que les zones 
de chasse sportive couvrent 12% du territoire national. La marge de profit des guides professionnels était devenue négative, avec un profit 
annuel autour de –0.7 million d’Euros. La crise sévère que traverse le secteur de la chasse sportive est principalement due à une augmentation 
des coûts de gestion des zones de chasse et au prix décroissant de ces safaris. L’Etat joue un rôle crucial pour rehausser l’attractivité de ce secteur 
en rétablissant la sécurité dans la région Nord et par des mesures techniques visant à (1) clarifier le processus d’allocation des zones de chasse, 
(2) simplifier la réglementation et (3) établir un système incitatif de mise en œuvre de la loi aux échelles nationale et locale.
¿es la caza de trofeo un modelo económico rentable para la conservación de la biodiversidad 
en Camerún?
G. LESCUYER, J. NGoUhoUo PoUfoUN, L. DEfo, D. BASTIN y P. SChoLTE
En África central, la caza de trofeo consiste en un enfoque basado en incentivos para la gestión sostenible de la fauna. Compilamos datos de la 
administración pública a cargo de la fauna, de empresas de safari y caza, y de comités locales de gestión de la fauna, para proveer un orden de 
magnitud del desempeño financiero de este sector en Camerún. En 2012, la caza de trofeo podía generar una facturación anual de € 7.5 millón 
y su valor agregado podía ascender a solamente 0.0001% del PIB, a pesar de que esas áreas de caza cubren el 12% del territorio nacional. El 
margen de ganancia para los guías profesionales se volvió negativo, con una ganancia anual neta de aproximadamente € –0.7 millón. La crisis 
severa en el sector de la caza de trofeo se debe esencialmente a un incremento de los costos de gestión en las zonas de caza y a una disminución 
del precio de los safaris de caza. El Estado juega un papel crucial mejorando el atractivo financiero de la caza de trofeo a través de la 
restauración de la seguridad en la región Norte y de medidas técnicas para (1) aclarar el proceso de atribución de áreas de caza, (2) simplificar 
regulaciones y (3) establecer un sistema de incentivos para la aplicación de leyes a nivel nacional y local.
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with commercial hunting, but as a separate activity in the 
1930s with the appearance of specialized hunting guides 
(Roulet 2004). This activity has continued since then in many 
countries of Central Africa. In Cameroon, the requirement 
to maximize foreign currency income and to increase tax 
revenues, related to the implementation of the Structural 
Adjustment Plans from the late 1980s, prompted the State to 
expand this land-use (Topa et al. 2009). In the northern region 
of Cameroon for instance, the area of formally leased hunting 
zones occupied 2.61 million ha in 2011, which was 3.6 times 
larger than the area in 1968 when hunting zones were first 
established (Yasuda 2012). 
In Cameroon, there are two main types of sport hunting 
areas. The hunting Zones (hZ) constitute the first category: 
according to article No. 92 of the forest Act, they are defined 
as permanent forest areas of the national domain that are 
designated as protected areas reserved for professional 
hunting. They can be exploited by the administration in charge 
of wildlife but, in most cases, the Cameroon State delegates 
management to the hunting guides through five-year leases, 
while (formally) retaining certain functions such as the anti-
poaching (Robinson 2008). Management is regulated by a 
simple management plan which specifies detailed rules for 
each leased hunting area (Egbe 2001, Mayaka et al. 2005). 
In addition, hunting guides must comply with specifications 
that include social clauses. The tenants are also required 
to provide local residents with social amenities (mostly 
employment) to the extent possible. 
The second category of sport hunting areas is the 
Community-Managed hunting Zone (CMhZ). Unlike hZs, 
which are located in the permanent forest estate, CMhZs 
extend into both the non-permanent forest estate and in 
certain categories of the permanent estate like logging 
concessions (Vermeulen et al. 2009). This concept is not 
defined in the 1994 forest and Wildlife Law, but resulted from 
a review of the notion of hunting territories provided for 
in Decree No. 95/466/PM dated 20 July 1995 (Egbe 2001). 
The CMhZ concept appeared during the establishment of 
the “Mambele Convention” in June 1999 and was formally 
endorsed by the Ministerial Decree No. 1236 dated 20 
September 2000 (Assembe Mvondo 2006). It is an attempt 
at community-based conservation to ensure the long-term 
survival of animal species by involving local people in 
wildlife management and allowing communities to derive 
economic benefits from wildlife resources (Baker 2007). To 
that end, local wildlife management committees (Comités 
de Valorisation des Ressources Fauniques – CoVAREf) 
were established for the CMhZs. They are first supposed 
to co-manage CMhZs with the hunting guides selected by 
the wildlife administration. Secondly, CoVAREfs receive a 
portion of taxes paid by hunting guides to be used to support 
local development. 
Sport hunting is practiced in Cameroon over large con-
tiguous areas that provide an adequate habitat for wildlife 
populations. In 2013, Cameroon had 71 hZs, CMhZs and 
co-managed hunting zones (i.e. hZs with greater involvement 
of the local population) covering some 5 700 000 ha, more 
than 12% of the national area (DfAP 2013). These different 
INTRoDUCTIoN
Wildlife conservation takes various forms, from exclusionary 
national parks to community-managed ecosystems. The 
national park is the oldest model in Central Africa for for-
mally organizing the conservation of nature. The objective of 
protecting iconic species and landscapes justified the creation 
of the first national park – the Virunga national park – in 1925 
and of most parks throughout the twentieth century in Central 
Africa (Devers and Vande weghe 2007). They were created by 
the States with little regard to the interests of local communi-
ties. Restrictions to customary uses of natural resources were 
expected to be offset by income from tourism and, more 
recently, by payments for environmental services. Classic 
applications of such top-down conservation strategies in 
Central Africa have been widely contested due to their impact 
on the social and economic condition of communities 
and their limited contribution to the protection of natural 
resources (Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau 2006, Njiforti and 
Tchamba 1993).
In the 1980s, Integrated Conservation Development 
Programmes (ICDPs) were widely adopted to attempt to 
combine the conservation of biodiversity with community 
development in protected areas (Pretty and Smith 2004, 
Western and Wright 1994). While positions have varied 
tremendously, both conservationists and social scientists have 
criticized ICDPs (Brandon and Wells 1992, Brechin et al. 
2002), contributing to their declining popularity (Spiteri 
and Nepal 2006, Sunderland et al. 2008). In Central Africa, 
Binot and Joiris (2007) highlighted the challenges faced by 
these programmes in valuing customary tenure and decision-
making processes. Wilkie et al. (2001) and Sandker et al. 
(2009) emphasized the need for substantial, permanent and 
long-term funding to support this approach, which is still rare 
in Central Africa.
Community-based natural resources management is 
also the basis for recent attempts to conserve nature by using 
traditional ecological knowledge and bring direct benefits to 
communities (Balint 2006, hayes 2006, Sayer et al. 2005, 
Spiteri and Nepal 2006). Yet in Central Africa, apart from 
a few successes like the Tayna Nature Reserve in DRC 
(Vagheni Kakule 2008), formal community-based manage-
ment of natural resources has often resulted in a deterioration 
of natural capital, as so far shown in the community forests 
of Cameroon (Bruggeman et al. 2015, Cuny et al. 2004). 
The negative impacts of local use on forest environments on 
a local scale have led to disenchantment with community-
based approaches (hackel 1999, Sunderland et al. 2008).
As an alternative to these three strategies for nature 
conservation, trophy hunting –also known as sport or safari 
hunting – can also contribute to wildlife protection, but its 
performance is poorly known in Central Africa (Lindsey et al. 
2007, Roulet 2004, Wilkie and Carpenter 1999). Trophy hunt-
ing is run by private operators who lease hunting areas and 
camps from the State, market and sell hunts to – usually 
wealthy foreign – clients, and employ local staff to organize 
safaris. In Central Africa, trophy hunting has been practised 
since the beginning of the 20th century, first in association 
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hunting areas are divided into savannah in the northern 
regions and dense forest areas in the southern provinces 
(Table 1 and figure 1). In savannah areas, the species 
most appreciated by trophy hunters are the bush elephant 
(Loxodonta africana), the African buffalo (Syncerus caffer) 
and the large antelopes such as the giant eland (Taurotragus 
derbianus), roan antelope (Hippotragus equinus) and 
hartebeest (Alcelaphus buselaphus). In the rainforest zone, 
bongos (Tragelaphus euryceros), forest elephants (Loxodonta 
cyclotis), sitatungas (Tragelaphus spekei) or giant hogs 
(Hylochoerus meinertzhageni) are the major hunted species. 
Unlike to command-and-control approaches, trophy hunt-
ing is an incentive-based and private-led activity for conserva-
tion, like payment for environmental services or certification 
(ferraro and Kiss 2002). All these mechanisms are gaining 
importance in the international debate and, in Central Africa, 
trophy hunting appears to be the most experimented model 
of deriving regular income from sustainable use of natural 
resources. for instance, timber certification started in 
Cameroon in 2005 and only covers 850 000 hectares in 2015. 
Similarly, actual initiatives of payment for environmental 
services remain very limited in Central Africa (Lescuyer et al. 
2009). In addition, most national parks were created without 
direct economic justification and none of them in Central 
Africa is self-funded through ecotourism or other revenues. 
The creation of areas dedicated to trophy hunting and the 
introduction of hunting permits are equivalent to the agency 
privatizing a space and species that were previously open 
access resources (Kiss 1990, Swanson 1991). The commodi-
fication of certain species and of public lands restricts most 
local uses, but it provides a financial value to these resources 
that should allow their sustainable exploitation (Chardonnet 
1995, Roulet 2007). on the one hand, instead of being 
supported by the local population, the conservation effort is 
paid for by a small number of rich hunters. on the other hand, 
sport hunting generates income to remunerate the actors who 
contribute to the protection of the hunting areas (Baker 2007, 
Robinson 2008, van der Wal and Djoh 2001).
overall, the success of sport hunting for sustainable wild-
life management depends on the level of financial benefits 
drawn by the main three stakeholders: the hunting guides 
must make an acceptable profit, the State must at least main-
tain the global tax amount and the local population must 
procure a significant share of the revenues. Several publica-
tions in the 1990s and 2000s (Baker 2007, Chardonnet 1995, 
Lindsey et al. 2007, Roulet 2004, UICN/PACo 2009) 
reviewed the main benefits of trophy hunting in Central 
Africa. The purpose of this article is to update the financial 
assessment of trophy hunting in Cameroon in order to discuss 
the current and future performance of this incentive-based 
approach. 
After a brief presentation of the methods, three financial 
assessments are provided: (1) the financial costs and revenues 
of trophy hunting at national level; (2) the planned and current 
levels of tax revenues; (3) the distribution of revenues among 
stakeholders. The discussion sums up the financial perfor-
mance of this model of wildlife management, concluding a 
few options for revitalizing this approach in Cameroon.
METhoDS 
Existing studies of trophy hunting are fragmented, due to the 
heterogeneity of practices and of ecological conditions. for 
instance, several hunting companies are effectively involved 
in managing wildlife and in anti-poaching activities to try to 
reduce the level of threat in their areas through adequate 
skills, staff and resources. other professional guides are mostly 
interested in leading such a way of life, with a secondary 
TABLE 1 Number and size of hunting zones and community-






Surface: 2 384 714 ha
Number: 19




Surface: 283 723 ha
Number: 19
Surface: 1 251 435 ha
fIGURE 1 Location of hunting zones and community- 
managed hunting zones in Cameroon
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by conventionally aggregating net financial benefit, payroll, 
depreciation of equipment and taxation.
Despite a broad review of existing data on trophy hunting 
in Cameroon, much information was missing or only partially 
available to estimate the financial benefits of this activity on 
a national scale. Several assumptions were therefore made for 
the calculations. Instead of a long list of hypotheses presented 
in this section, they are made explicit with the presentation 
of the results showing how they influenced the estimations. 
Moreover, most data used for the assessments date from 
2012 and 2013, before the negative impacts of the slaughter 
of elephants at the Bouba N’Djida national park and of the 
extension of Boko haram in this region are fully felt by pro-
fessional hunting guides. The situation of the trophy hunting 
sector in 2015 is probably worse than the description done in 
the article.
RESULTS
Evolution of the importance of trophy hunting in the 
North region since the 1970s
After an initial increase between 1968 and 1980 the number 
of sport hunters visiting the North savanna region has fluctu-
ated between 150 and 250 a year (figure 2). The relatively 
high numbers in 2010–2014 may be attributed to a shift of 
hunters no longer able to visit the Central African Republic, 
because of security reasons. The latest (2015) decline 
suggests that also North Cameroon is increasingly perceived 
as ‘insecure’.
Taxes received (hunting zone leasing, hunting license tax 
and harvesting tax) in the North Region (in €, corrected for 
inflation) have increased three-fold from the 1970s to the late 
2000s (figure 3). however, since the top year 2008, a clear 
decline has set in, with in 2015 taxes only half the amount 
of 2008. 
Financial costs and revenues of trophy hunting areas
Revenue from trophy hunting depends on the number of safa-
ris organized in hZs and CMhZs that have been leased to 
professional guides. however, each year, several hunting 
zones are not allocated, as shown in Table 2 for 2012, and 
remain inactive.
There are several safari options that vary according to the 
length of stay, type of hunted animals, number of hunters, etc. 
In the absence of precise information on the number and types 
of safaris sold by professional guides in Cameroon in 2012, 
an average 12-day safari scenario was assumed, in which one 
hunter is allowed to shoot two animals of group I and four 
animals of group II. This “bag of game” package is offered by 
all hunting guides (Mayaka et al. 2005, UICN/PACo 2009) 
and is in the middle of their range of services. for such a 
safari, the official fee is around € 30 000 in rainforest and 
€ 20 000 in savannah, but these prices are negotiated by the 
customers and usually decrease by 10%. These amounts are 
of the same order of magnitude as those proposed by Wilkie 
interest in running a profitable business, sometimes without 
the proper tools to correctly exploit their area. At the other end 
of the spectrum, some guides are more like speculators, not 
interested in properly managing their hunting zone and aban-
doning this activity after a few years of detrimental practices. 
Given the diversity, complexity and opaqueness of this 
sector, it was not possible to quantify the benefits of the 
various sport hunting practices. In this study, we conducted a 
financial analysis for an “average” sport hunting activity in 
Cameroon, which was elaborated with simplistic assumptions 
on the basis of current economic data. This article used 
secondary data from scientific publications and technical 
reports, i.e.
– Information collected by the Department of Wildlife 
and Protected Areas in 2012 for a sample of nine hZs 
and one CMhZ. These data covered the duties and 
taxes paid, attendance, jobs, shooting performance, 
roads and social works undertaken by guides.
– Annual reports from the 1970s by the delegation of 
Wildlife and Protected Areas of the North region to 
assess the number of hunters (with ‘permis de grande 
chasse’) and hunting taxes. 
– Data supplied in several reports written by WWf 
covering both the North and East regions.
– Information provided by six hunting guides regarding 
their safari packages in Cameroon, for the savannah 
and the dense forest areas.
– other technical documents were consulted from two 
main sources: (1) websites such as PSfE (http://www.
cameroun-foret.com/), SAILD (http://pmb.sicac.org/
opac_css) and CBfP (http://pfbc-cbfp.org/); (2) inter-
nal documents and M.Sc. theses collected through pro-
fessional relationships with institutions, universities, 
projects, enterprises and consultants. 
Information from the scientific literature was preferred to 
data from technical reports. When data were different for 
the same variable, the smallest estimate was used in order to 
limit the risk of an overstatement of income or cost.
A simplified cost-benefit analysis was used to evaluate the 
financial benefits of trophy hunting in Cameroon. By defini-
tion, the financial benefits relate to the revenue streams to the 
different actors (Brent 2006). Inflows are made from sales of 
safari and of the products associated with this activity. They 
are gross financial benefits, or turnover. outflows are the 
actual costs incurred by the actors to obtain financial benefits. 
The total financial cost aggregates investment, operating and 
transaction costs. The difference between the gross financial 
benefit and the financial cost is the net benefit, i.e. the profit 
that the actors derive from the activity.
In contrast with a standard cost-benefit analysis, this 
assessment covered one year only, without planning the 
evolution of the sport hunting sector over the medium and 
long-term. The objective was to evaluate its financial and 
economic importance on a national scale for one year in order 
to compare this assessment to macroeconomic aggregates. 
To do this, the added value of the sector was calculated 
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and Carpenter (1999) and Roulet (2004), once updated to 
2012. These average prices of safari package are combined to 
the quantitative data collected for our sample of 10 hunting 
areas to assess the average turnover of trophy hunting per 
hectare.
To organise hunting safaris, a professional guide who has 
leased a hunting area faces seven types of costs:
· Initial investment to lay out the hunting area, to 
purchase equipment and to construct buildings, is 
estimated at $ 200 000 by Mayaka (2005). This 
investment is depreciated over a 10-year period. 
· The leasing rights vary between € 0.07–0.23/ha/yr 
with an average of € 0.15/ha/yr for the forest area 
(Moaza and Gwet 2007), and around € 0.1/ha/an in the 
northern regions (DfAP 2013, Yasuda 2012). 
· The harvesting tax varies from species to species. 
Its average value is € 0.1/ha/yr in forest area and 
€ 0.2/ha/yr in savannah (DfAP 2013). In the southeast 
area, there is also a 10% surcharge paid to communi-
ties (Defo et al. 2010).
· other taxes related to firearm licence, penalties, etc. 
are estimated around € 4 200/yr for each hZ and 
CMhZ (DfAP 2013).
· Each hZ and CMhZ recruits 15 people, 60% of whom 
are temporary and are paid only from April to July and 
40% permanent (DfAP 2013). The payroll is about 
€ 0.21/ha/yr for savannah hZ, € 0.32/ha/yr for forest 
hZ, and € 0.60/ha/yr for CMhZ. Mayaka (2002) eval-
uated the cost of local labour at € 0.28/ha/yr and Croes 
et al. (2011) estimated the annual revenue from hZs at 
around € 0.39/ha/yr for local populations.
· Social contributions by lessees for the benefit of 
communities amount an average cost of € 0.03/ha/yr 
(DfAP 2013). 
· The lessee must also support many other operating 
expenses related to the reception of clients and to 
hunting: maintenance of access roads and camp, fuel, 
maintenance of vehicles, public relations, food, etc. 
It was not possible to have quantified information on 
these operational expenses. however, the standard 
estimate for managing a protected area amounted to 
€ 1.5/ha/yr (UICN/PAPECo 2009). This figure was 
increased by 10% to update this data and to integrate 
hZ specific running costs. The figure of € 1.65/ha/yr 
was used as a proxy to assess the operating costs in 
hZs and CMhZs. There is no estimate of the informal 
cost of transactions supported by the professional 
guide to lease a hunting area, which was therefore not 
included in the calculation.
The assessment of revenues and costs is summarized in 
Table 3 for the three categories of hunting area. The results are 
presented initially in € per hectare per year, and then extrapo-
lated to all active hunting areas in 2012 in Cameroon.
The aggregated amount of turnover for sport hunting was 
found to be around € 7.5 million in 2012. This estimate was 
20% lower than those reported by Roulet (2004) and Mayaka 
(2002). Net annual profit for professional guides was found 
to be € –0.76 million, with negative profit rates except for 
the forest hZs, which differed much from the diagnosis made 
by Mayaka et al. (2005) and Roulet (2004) a decade ago. 
The added value of the sport hunting sector was estimated 
at € 2.5 million per year, or 0.0001% of Cameroon’s GDP 
(non-oil) for 2013. 
fIGURE 2 Number of sport hunters in North Region, 
Cameroon (1968–2015)
fIGURE 3 Sport hunting taxes (€ inflation corrected till 
2012) in the North Region, Cameroon (1970–2015)
TABLE 2 Number of leased hunting zones and community-
managed hunting zones in 2012 (DFAP 2013)
Types of hunting zone % of active hunting 
zones
hZ Savana (North) 78% (19 out of 26)
hZ forest (East, Centre, South) 68% (13 out of 19)
CMhZ (East, Centre, South) 32% (6 out of 19)
CMhZ (Nord) 43% (3 out of 7)
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TABLE 3 Financial benefits and costs of trophy hunting in Cameroon
average in €/ha/yr HZ savannah HZ forest CMHZ
Private benefits and costs    
Turnover 1.78 2.18 2.18
Starting investment 0.17 0.17 0.17
Payroll 0.21 0.32 0.60
Social works 0.03 0.03 0.03
other operating expenses 1.65 1.65 1.65
Profit for the hunting guides –0.29 0.01 –0.27
Specific taxes    
Right of lease 0.10 0.15 0.15
harvesting tax (State) 0.21 0.09 0.09
Surcharge of the harvesting tax (communities) 0.00 0.01 0.01
other taxes (penalities…) 0.05 0.05 0.05
Surfaces leased in 2012 2,127,274 1,117,523 583,669
    
in €/yr HZ savannah HZ forest CMHZ TOTAL
Private benefits and costs     
Turnover 3,779,758 2,439,267 1,274,000 7,493,026
Starting investment 368,212 193,433 101,028 662,673
Payroll 452,922 361,504 351,653 1,166,079
Social works 64,860 34,073 17,796 116,729
other operating expenses 3,504,881 1,841,223 961,649 6,307,753
Profit –611,118 9,034 –158,125 –760,209
Specific taxes     
Right of lease 214,039 170,365 88,980 473,384
harvesting tax (State) 456,065 98,481 51,435 605,981
Surcharge of the harvesting tax (communities) 0 9,848 5,144 14,992
other taxes (penalities…) 100,533 52,813 27,584 180,930
Moreover, since 2012, several factors have tended to fur-
ther reduce the profitability of trophy hunting in Cameroon. 
on the one hand, the declining numbers of lions and elephants 
in hunting areas as well as the recent European Union ban 
on imports of lion and hippopotamus (Hippopotamus 
amphibious) trophies have driven down the price of hunting 
packages. on the other hand, hunting areas are under increas-
ing pressure from both the expansion of large-scale poaching 
(Maisels et al. 2013), encroachments by rural people to 
develop agriculture (Mayaka et al. 2005, omondi et al. 2008), 
and climate of insecurity in the northern part of Cameroon. 
These threats have probably increased the operational cost 
involved in managing hunting areas. 
Actual versus potential tax revenues
Two factors reduce the level of tax revenue derived from sport 
hunting in Cameroon: (1) many hunting areas are not claimed 
by professional guides; (2) in leased hunting areas, shooting 
plans are never fully carried out (DfAP 2013). figure 4 com-
pares the maximum tax level, when all hZs and CMhZs are 
leased and subjected to the payment of the leasing fee and 
when all shooting programmes are fulfilled and subjected to 
the harvesting tax, with actual tax revenues. 
The full application of the sport hunting plan as pro-
grammed by the administration, albeit for some species 
such as lion with unsustainable high numbers till 2015, would 
lead to an increase in direct tax revenues of about € 1 million 
per year. 
Distribution of trophy hunting revenues
There are several taxes applicable to sport hunting, but two of 
them make up the bulk of the payments made by the hunting 
guides: (1) the right to lease, a fee based on the size of the hZ 
or CMhZ; (2) the harvesting tax depending on the number 
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and type of animals killed. Part of these taxes and fees is 
redistributed to communities and councils (Table 4).
In addition to direct taxes, there are four other sources 
of revenue derived from trophy hunting: profit, payroll, indi-
rect taxes and the cash contribution to build local infrastruc-
ture. All these revenues are shared among four categories 
of stakeholder:
– The State recovers 50% of hZ leasing rights, of the 
harvesting tax and of various other taxes related to 
sport hunting, 20% of payroll in the form of social 
contributions, and 19.25% of other current expendi-
ture through the value added tax.
– Councils are entitled to 40% of the hZ leasing fee;
– Local people – composed of communities neighbour-
ing hZs, communities involved in CMhZs and 
employees of hunting guides – receive 10% of hZ 
leasing rights, 100% of CMhZ leasing rights, 100% 
of the harvesting tax surcharge in the forest area, 80% 
of the payroll, and all social works carried out in the 
villages;
– The lessees of hZs and CMhZs make a profit from 
this activity.
The distribution of revenues from sport hunting among 
these four stakeholders is shown in figure 5.
Contrasting earlier publications (Mayaka et al. 2005, 
Wilkie and Carpenter 1999, Yasuda 2012) which ranked hunt-
ing guides first, the State has become the main beneficiary 
of the trophy hunting activity with annual revenues reaching 
€ 1.6 million. This difference is due, on the one hand, to the 
fact that this estimate integrates general taxation and not only 
the specific taxation related to sport hunting. on the other 
hand, the level of profit made by private guides has substan-
tially decreased over the last decade.
This distribution of revenues is more favourable to com-
munities than in previous studies as our assessment included 
local wages and not only reassigned taxes. The wage paid to 
individual people amounts to 76% of the total amount that 
communities receive from trophy hunting. however, the 
total redistributed amount of 0.8 million to local population 
remains very small with regard to the number of inhabitants 
neighbouring the hunting areas of Cameroon.
DISCUSSIoN
Trophy hunting has become a weak incentive-based conser-
vation scheme, which is based on an inefficient business 
model and on a questionable governance.
A declining business model
Despite its potential local importance in sparsely-inhabited 
areas, the trophy hunting industry remains a very minor eco-
nomic sector on a national level, when judged by its contribu-
tion to GDP. Previous assessments by Mayaka et al. (2005) 
fIGURE 4 Planned and actual tax levels on a national scale 
(€/yr)
TABLE 4 Distribution scheme of the main taxes accruing from trophy hunting
Right to lease Harvesting tax
hZ – 50% for the state
– 40% for the councils
– 10% for the communities
– 100% for state
– Surcharge of 10% for the local wildlife management committees (in East region)
CMhZ –  100% for the local wildlife 
management committee
– 100% for state
– Surcharge of 10% for the local wildlife management committees (in East region)
fIGURE 5 Distribution of revenues accruing from trophy 
hunting among 4 stakeholders
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indicated that this activity was profitable for private operators, 
with a return rate of between 18% and 36%. Updated estima-
tions of the turnover, costs and profit of trophy hunting in 
Cameroon show that this activity has become unprofitable for 
many professional guides.
With a decreasing level of profit for private operators, the 
State of Cameroon has become the main beneficiary of sport 
hunting through the collection of direct and indirect taxes. 
Nevertheless, hunting tax revenues are far from what was 
planned by the administration, with a shortfall of € 1 million 
per year.
Local communities have received around € 0.8 million 
from trophy hunting per year but this amount is not enough 
to generate local support for this land use, for two reasons. 
on the one hand, most of these benefits come through indi-
vidual wages and not through collective institutions which 
might commit themselves to supporting trophy hunting. on 
the other hand, hunting-based land-use remains, at least at 
short term, 200 times less profitable than cotton planting in 
northern Cameroon (Mayaka 2002) and therefore generates 
substantial opportunity costs for local actors.
The overall distribution of trophy hunting revenues is 
more beneficial to the State and local communities than fif-
teen years ago, but this condition is not sufficient to guarantee 
the acceptance of this activity by stakeholders. Today, the 
weak financial legitimacy of the sport hunting model comes 
not so much from an inequitable process of income distribu-
tion but from a smaller amount of distributed income. Except 
for the State which keeps collecting direct and indirect taxes, 
trophy hunting is no longer an incentive-based approach for 
professional guides nor for communities.
The good overall number of hunters still visiting Came-
roon (figure 2) should not be interpreted a sign that sport 
hunting is a healthy business. The declining sport hunting 
taxes (2008–2015, figure 3) and the recent abandoning of 
sport hunting zones are clear signs of the declining perfor-
mance of the sector. The evolution of sport hunting seems 
to follow a rent-seeking model where the hunting areas are 
gradually over-exploited and then abandoned once large 
animal species have disappeared, as it has been seen in 
several logging concessions with valuable timber species 
(Karsenty 1998).
An incentive-based approach flawed by the state’s 
failures
It is commonplace to compare the incentive-based schemes 
for biodiversity conservation whose success relies on the 
economic behaviours of private actors with the command-
and-control approaches implemented by the administration. 
In fact, the success of incentive-based approaches also 
depends on an appropriate legal framework and governance in 
which the State plays a major role. Thus, the business model 
of sport hunting in Cameroon would be more efficient if the 
State fully assumed three of its prerogatives.
firstly, the allocation of hZs and CMhZs to professional 
guides does not meet minimum conditions of transparency. 
Unlike the logging sector which underwent a governance 
reform in the 1990s (Karsenty 2006, Topa et al. 2009), sport 
hunting in Cameroon is still characterized by the establish-
ment of accommodating relationships between private opera-
tors and representatives of the administration (Lindsey et al. 
2006, 2007, Mayaka et al. 2005, UICN/PACo 2009). 
Secondly, the multiplication of procedures imposed on 
CoVAREfs since 2009 is contrary to an effective delegation 
of wildlife management by local populations in the CMhZs 
(Defo et al. 2010). Rather than being dedicated to improving 
local livelihoods or to managing CMhZ, a significant portion 
of these funds is spent in operating these CoVAREfs 
(Bigombe 2010, Assembe Mvondo 2006). The improved 
performance of these local committees would require a 
significant simplification of procedures, especially as they 
apply to small amounts of money.
Lastly, the State devotes very few resources to enforcing 
regulations and monitoring the practices of managers of hunt-
ing areas. for instance, management plans, social specifica-
tions, or monitoring protocols are almost never drawn up and 
even less so applied or controlled in the Cameroonian hZs 
(Roulet 2004), although these are legal requirements. In the 
south-east CMhZs for example, abundance indices for the 
main species of large mammals were estimated in the early 
2000s by Nzooh et al. (2002), in 2007 and 2015. Those inven-
tories showed a decline in the population of medium and 
large mammals in 80% of the south-east CMhZs (Defo and 
Tchamba 2012), although the 2015 survey suggests this 
decline has stabilized (Nzooh, pers. comm., 2015). The only 
overall wildlife monitoring for the savannah hZ was done by 
WWf ten years ago, indicating low animal densities (omondi 
et al. 2008). We are aware of only five hZ managers who have 
commissioned wildlife surveys of their respective zones, and 
not more than once since 2005. This lack of wildlife monitor-
ing hides the decline in key animal populations (lion, ele-
phant, buffalo, large antelopes) in many sport hunting zones 
(Croes et al. 2011, Scholte 2011), with off-take quotas being 
based at best on guesswork, and at worst established to maxi-
mize tax revenue or to meet customers’ requests (Lindsey 
et al. 2007). 
The difficulty for the State in enforcing its own rules is 
not specific to the sport hunting industry. The fight against 
climate change and the sustainable production of timber 
face similar obstacles. But in these two sectors, the control of 
compliance by operators is now exercised by private organi-
zations, like the Verified Carbon Standard for the initiatives 
of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degra-
dation (REDD) or bureau Veritas and SmartWood for the 
legality of timber. Several authors have argued for the estab-
lishment of a similar process of private certification for sport 
hunting to ensure the legality and sustainability of practices 
(Lindsey et al. 2006, 2007). But, unlike other incentive-based 
schemes for biodiversity conservation, the killing of emblem-
atic animals, as ecologically sustainable as it may be, is little 
tolerated by a large share of American and European popula-
tions (Brown and Williams 2003), which would reduce the 
social acceptability of such a certification process.
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CoNCLUSIoN – TWo PRoSPECTS foR TRoPhY 
hUNTING
As locally dominant land-use option, sport hunting has shown 
a declining profitability in Cameroon over the last decade, 
mainly due to poor governance, external threats and recent 
insecurity of many hunting areas. With the entire trophy hunt-
ing sector internationally under pressure (UICN/PACo 2009) 
and with growing pressures on rural areas, a pragmatic two 
tier approach may regain the legitimacy and the performance 
of this option of sustainable wildlife management. firstly, 
nowadays several hZs are of limited value due to the scarcity 
of the species sought by trophy hunters. These hZs should 
therefore be downgraded and re-allocated to other more real-
istic land-uses. Trophy hunting would no longer be consid-
ered as the dominant purpose of a specialized area but as a 
secondary objective of a specialized land-use in agriculture, 
logging or ranching (Lindsey et al. 2007). 
Conversely, many sport hunting zones remain promising 
and justify the specialization of these areas. The purpose is to 
strengthen their socio-economic and environmental perfor-
mance, as well as cater for the payment of other ecosystem 
services, to better compete with other land-use options. The 
major challenge is to re-establish the attractiveness of the 
Cameroonian hZ, notably through the restoration of security 
in the Northern region. Several technical improvements are 
also possible through a clarification and an improvement of 
the State’s role in this incentive-based approach. firstly, the 
transparent, competitive and fair allocation of hZs would 
refine the relationships between private operators and the 
administration (Baker 2007). Secondly, rather than diluting 
responsibilities and multiplying procedures, it is for the State 
to operate a pragmatic devolution of wildlife management 
to actors. Lastly, the State representatives must be urged to 
enforce regulation and laws regarding hunting areas, notably 
for monitoring management and harvesting practices. Beyond 
merely increasing operational means, the main requirement 
is to establish incentive schemes in which law enforcement 
provides more benefits to administrative staff than the current 
lack of official control.
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